Back to the future by Cowper-Coles, Sherand
 11 Nação e Defesa
B a c k  t o  t h e  F u t u r e *
* This article is an edited extract from the author’s latest book “Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s Afgha‑
nistan Campaign”, published in May 2011 by Harper Collins Ome.
Resumo
Regresso ao Futuro
É inquestionável o facto de o Ocidente ter deci‑
dido intervir militarmente no Afeganistão em 
Outubro de 2001 sem ter uma ideia clara sobre 
as consequências de tal decisão, bem como 
poderia mais tarde vir a retirar ‑se deste teatro 
de operações. Sem se aperceber, o Ocidente 
envolveu ‑se num conflito multidimensional e 
com múltiplos actores que se digladiam entre si 
há várias décadas.
Este é um conflito que coloca em confronto várias 
forças políticas afegãs, o Islão com o secularismo, 
a tradição com a modernidade, as cidades com 
as zonas rurais, os Sunitas com os Xiítas, os 
camponeses com os nómadas, os Pashtuns com 
os Tadjiques, os Uzbeques com os Hazaras. O 
conflito irá continuar a não ser que estas díades 
dialécticas sejam resolvidas, bem como as relações 
do Afeganistão com os países vizinhos, através 
de um processo ambicioso e continuado assente 
num modelo tipo jirga que envolva as dimensões 
internas e externas do país e que seja patrocina‑
do pelos Estados Unidos e pelas Nações Unidas 
e apoiado pelos cinco Membros Permanentes do 
seu Conselho de Segurança (EUA, Rússia, China, 
França e Grã ‑Bretanha), pela NATO, pela União 
Europeia e pelos restantes actores regionais.
Abstract
It is unarguable that the West got into Afghanistan 
in October 2001 without a clear idea either of what 
it was getting into or of how it was going to get out. 
Without realising it, the West became involved in a 
multi ‑player, multi ‑dimensional, multi ‑decade civil 
conflict, the origins of which go back many years. It 
is an unresolved struggle, over the nature of the 
Afghan polity, between Islam and secularism, 
tradition and modernism, town and country, Sunni 
and Shia, farmer and nomad, Pashtun and Tajik, 
Uzbek and Hazara. 
Unless and until those problems, and Afghanistan’s 
relations with its neighbours and near neighbours, 
are addressed through an ambitious and continuing 
jirga ‑like process, internal and external, sponsored 
by the US and the UN, supported by the Permanent 
Five Members of the UN Security Council (the US, 
Russia, China, France and Britain), NATO and the 
EU, and engaging all regional players, conflict will 
continue
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‘Tell me, how does this end?’ the then Major General Petraeus of the 101st Air-
borne division is said to have asked a Washington Post reporter in iraq in the 
summer of 2003. From June 2010, when he succeeded his former subordinate, Stan 
Mcchrystal, as iSAF commander, until July 2011, General david Petraeus, more 
than any other individual, was in charge of deciding how this latest Afghan war 
ended.
Petraeus made major changes in the pace and direction of the war. As the 
press reported, he authorised, indeed encouraged, more violence, lifting the limits 
Mcchrystal had placed on the use of airpower and on iSAF rules of engagement. 
He ordered a quantum leap in the number of Special Forces strikes against Tali-
ban commanders and boasted regularly of a rising body count. He launched a 
programme to establish local militias and apparently set aside American qualms 
about working with some of Afghanistan’s most unsavoury warlords. More po-
sitively, he made more money available for reintegrating Taliban fighters. He went 
to great lengths to convince American politicians and press that iSAF was breaking 
the momentum of the insurgency and was therefore succeeding. He also tried to 
lower expectations, by playing down the start of the withdrawal of American 
troops in July 2011, focusing instead on 2014.
in her Richard Holbrooke Memorial Address in February 2011, Mrs. Hillary 
clinton promised a new diplomatic surge to accompany the military and civilian 
surges launched by the Obama Administration two years earlier.
Linking the Taliban with Al Qaeda as part of a single ‘syndicate of terror’, the 
Secretary of State warned them that they could not wait America out and could 
not defeat America. But, if they broke with Al Qaeda, renounced violence and 
agreed to abide by the Afghan constitution, then they could join an Afghan -led 
process of reconciliation and be allowed to take part in the political life of Afgha-
nistan. 
The military surge had blunted the momentum of the insurgency. Province by 
province, between now and the end of 2014, nATO forces would withdraw, and 
Afghanistan would take responsibility for its own security, in a ‘responsible’ tran-
sition. The civilian surge had bolstered the government of Afghanistan, by tripling 
(to 1,100) the number of American development experts on the ground in Afgha-
nistan; and it was giving the Taliban the economic and social incentives for parti-
cipating in political life. The third leg – the diplomatic surge – would support an 
Afghan -led process of reconciliation within Afghanistan, and engage Pakistan and 
all Afghanistan’s other neighbours and near neighbours behind that process. Ame-
rica would insist that the human rights of all Afghans, including women and mi-
norities, were protected in this process.
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Admirable though most of these sentiments are, three and a half years is not 
time enough to create across Afghanistan reasonably clean, credible and inclusive 
institutions with both the capacity and the will to secure and govern, on a sustai-
nable basis, the vast areas of the country and of its national life in the grip of in-
surgency or criminal anarchy.
nor can one help asking whether Obama’s America is up for the challenge of 
driving such a process forward with all the political and diplomatic resources such 
a strategy would require. in many respects, it was the speech Mrs clinton should 
have made two years earlier. if only General Mcchrystal had been right when in 
February 2010 he promised the people of Marjah in Helmand that iSAF could de-
liver ‘government in a box’.
certainly, thanks to General Petraeus’s tactics, the Taliban took a hammering 
and pulled back into their sanctuaries within Afghanistan and across the border in 
Pakistan. Undoubtedly, some of them are more willing to parley. But the chances 
of acceptable governance filling, in any lasting way, the spaces being created by 
those tactics are not good. Such a military -focused approach risks making Afgha-
nistan safe not for better governance, but for the warlords and narco -mafias whom 
the Taliban originally targeted when they took power in the mid -1990s. Once again, 
the poor Afghan people – the population whom Mcchrystal rightly spoke of pro-
tecting – could be the losers.
Acts of anti -state terrorism, even on the obscene scale of 9/11, seldom in the-
mselves do significant objective damage to the interests of their target state. But 
real harm can be done when, as the terrorists hope, the attacked state is provoked 
into an irrationally disproportionate reaction, doing in the longer run far more 
damage to that state’s interests than the original terrorist attack. in the late 1940s, 
the US diplomat George Kennan devised the doctrine of containment, precisely 
because he feared such an irrational overreaction by the great democracy he served, 
to another perceived threat, that from Soviet Russia. i guess that Kennan would 
have been appalled by Bush’s reaction to the 9/11 atrocities: he would, i am sure, 
have wondered how any sensible statesman could declare war on ‘terror’, any more 
than he could declare war on evil or on war itself.
When, in earlier centuries, empires, such as those of Rome, Russia or Britain, 
were attacked from ungoverned territory across the imperial frontier, they re-
acted generally in one of three ways: they launched a punitive expedition to 
deter and punish those responsible for the offence, and withdrew as quickly as 
possible; or they established a client kingdom in the offending territory; or, very 
much third best, they annexed the offending territory and brought it within the 
imperial limes.
 15 Nação e Defesa
For an America wounded and vengeful in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 
Afghanistan was just such a troublesome territory, abutting the American empire’s 
mental frontier. Somehow, the source of the attack had to be dealt with, and those 
directly and indirectly responsible punished, swiftly and violently. What followed 
has been an uneasy transition from the first option – an in -and -out punitive expe-
dition – to the second – trying to establish a reliable client state, by means of a 
dysfunctional multinational mandate. 
The enterprise has proved to be a model of how not to go about such things, 
breaking all the rules of grand strategy: getting in without having any real idea 
of how to get out; almost wilful misdiagnosis of the nature of the challenges; 
continually changing objectives, and no coherent or consistent plan; mission 
creep on an heroic scale; disunity of political and military command, also on an 
heroic scale; diversion of attention and resources (to iraq) at a critical stage in the 
adventure; poor choice of local allies, who rapidly became more of a problem 
than a solution; unwillingness to co -opt the neighbours into the project, and thus 
address the mission -critical problem of external sanctuary and support; military 
advice, long on institutional self -interest, but woefully short on serious objective 
analysis of the problems of pacifying a broken country with largely non -existent 
institutions of government and security; weak political leadership, notably in 
subjecting to proper scrutiny militarily heavy approaches, and in explaining to 
increasingly, and now decisively, sceptical domestic press and public the benefits 
of expending so much treasure and blood. As Sir Rodric Braithwaite suggested 
in his book Afgantsy, without ever saying so explicitly, the parallels with the 
tragedy of Soviet Russia’s failed attempt to stabilise Afghanistan are too many 
and too close for comfort. 
Most tragically of all, intervening in Afghanistan in such haste in 2001 may not 
have been necessary, any more than Britain should have attacked the irish Republic 
in the wake of an iRA bombing on the english mainland. in October 2001 the Ta-
liban convened in Kandahar a great jirga to decide how to respond to American 
demands that Osama bin Laden and those responsible for the 9/11attacks be handed 
over. Some of those present believe that, given a bit more patience and pressure, 
the majority would gradually have swung in favour of expelling those Arabs and 
other foreigners who had abused Pashtun hospitality by orchestrating the 9/11 
attacks from Afghan territory.
Whatever the truth of that claim, it is unarguable that the West got into Afgha-
nistan in October 2001 without a clear idea either of what it was getting into or of 
how it was going to get out. Without realising it, we have become involved in a 
multi -player, multi -dimensional, multi -decade civil conflict, the origins of which 
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go back many years. it is an unresolved struggle, over the nature of the Afghan 
polity, between islam and secularism, tradition and modernism, town and country, 
Sunni and Shia, farmer and nomad, Pashtun and Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara. Unless 
and until those problems, and Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbours and near 
neighbours, are addressed through an ambitious and continuing jirga -like process, 
internal and external, sponsored by the US and the Un, supported by the Permanent 
Five Members of the Un Security council (the US, Russia, china, France and Bri-
tain), nATO and the eU, and engaging all regional players, conflict will continue. 
To have any chance of succeeding, such a process will need sustained and vigorous 
diplomatic engagement by the United States, from the President and Secretary of 
State down. in particular, America will need itself to talk to all the internal and 
external parties to the conflict, including the Taliban.
Better late than never, in March 2011, Lakhdar Brahimi and the distinguished 
retired US diplomat, Tom Pickering, recommended just such approach: that the US 
should promote a negotiated political settlement, involving all the internal and 
external parties to the conflict. in pursuing a peace settlement, we will need to 
accept, as we are already having to do, that often it may be better to let the Afghans 
themselves do a job badly than for us to do it for them. even if the Afghan way 
may be less effective, and more corrupt and inefficient, than the Western way, it 
may be wiser to let the Afghans make their own mistakes, and learn from them. 
However imperfect the results of such a process, they may last longer than attempts 
by outsiders to buck the Afghan market.
if, as is quite likely, the results of the three American surges – military, civilian 
and diplomatic – are ambiguous, our troops will still leave the Afghan battlefield. 
Our taxes will still subsidise, and the civilian apostles of stabilisation still support, 
whatever Afghan state we leave behind. But, as the House of commons Foreign 
Affairs committee pointed out in its report of March 2011, calling for a political 
surge, unless we somehow in the next three years engineer a sustainable Afghan 
political settlement, we risk finding that we get out, militarily, only to have to get 
back in, perhaps several decades from now, and in another form. if that happens, 
our present sacrifice may have been largely in vain.
The killing of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011 by US Special Forces changed 
everything and nothing. On the one hand, it brought to an end a man -hunt that 
had lasted nearly a decade, had caused America to invade and occupy two Muslim 
lands, and had cost America alone some $2,000 bn. it exposed, in compelling fashion, 
the dual nature of Pakistan’s relationships, with America, with terrorism, and with 
the truth. it showed how the war in Afghanistan had indeed been, in Richard 
Holbrooke’s words, against “the wrong enemy in the wrong country”. And it gave 
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Obama, running for re -election in 2012, the arguments he needed to bring the boys 
back home faster than his generals wanted. Most important, it offered an opportu-
nity to begin healing the wounds of 9/11, and for a fresh start in the relationship 
between America and islam. 
And yet in another sense what many Muslims saw as a revenge killing changed 
little. 
The Arab Spring of 2011 had shown how irrelevant Al Qaeda and its leader 
already were. The reasons for Muslim antipathy towards America, focused mainly 
on its one -sided approach to israel/Palestine, remained. islamic terrorism would 
continue, some of it perhaps inspired by bin Laden’s “martyrdom” and still bearing 
the AQ brand. The difficulties of extracting ourselves from Afghanistan any time 
soon while leaving behind an acceptable and enduring state able and willing to 
secure and govern its own territory were as great as ever. The unremitting pressu-
res of US domestic politics would still limit the American Republic’s ability to do 
the right thing abroad, in this case pressing hard and from the highest level for 
political settlements in and around Afghanistan, and between israel and Palestine.
But none of that meant that, with his new diplomatic A team in place, an Ame-
rican President who had always understood the realities better than most wouldn’t 
give it his best shot, within the limits of the politically possible. As Walter cronki-
te had pointed out for another war in another century, only thus could there be 
peace with honour. Only thus could we turn the temporary and local gains made 
at such cost by the military into long -term strategic success. 
And only thus could we look in the eye the widows and orphans, and the 
wounded, and the eager recruits, and the sceptical veterans of several tours in the 
Pathan badlands, and with a clear conscience assure them that the sacrifice had 
been worthwhile, that in Afghanistan “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori”.
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